The theoretical foundations of climate science have received little attention from philosophers thus far, despite a number of outstanding issues. We provide a brief, non-technical overview of several of these issues -related to theorizing about climates, climate change, internal variability and more -and attempt to make preliminary progress in addressing some of them. In doing so, we hope to open a new thread of discussion in the emerging area of philosophy of climate science, focused on theoretical foundations.
in another -e.g., using palaeo-data to inform conclusions about future climate change.
Importantly, we will see that it is a challenge to develop notions of climate states and climate sensitivity that are general enough to accommodate what we know about the climate system and, at the same time, sufficiently informative about physical aspects of climate to guide inference and explanation in climate science. We will also see that the current focus on reductive notions of climate states and climate systems might be less than optimal, given the goals of explaining and predicting climate.
Alongside pragmatic issues, we present issues that may have a pragmatic dimension but that appear primarily to be conceptual. The conceptual issues include tensions within ways of thinking about the boundary of the climate system as well as a lack of clarity about what exactly should count as internal variability and what should count as external variability.
Our discussion proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we focus on issues that arise when trying to characterize Earth's climate system. We discuss the challenge of identifying the boundaries of the system and consider whether the climate system should be characterized in a wholly reductive way, i.e., solely in terms of material constituents and their causal interactions.
Section 3 is concerned with theorizing about climate states. We consider the limitations of the standard statistical approach to characterizing climate states, and we argue for the benefits of a proposed alternative approach, which contends that climate states should be characterized in part in physical terms. The issue of reductionism resurfaces in this section as well, as we examine the suggestion that climate states can be characterized in part in terms of emergent properties.
Section 4 focuses on climate change and the closely related notion of climate sensitivity.
We note that it is an open question which aspects of the climate system should be appealed to in characterizing climate change, though very often the focus is on changes in global mean nearsurface air temperature. It is this change that is the focus, for instance, in standard analyses of the sensitivity of the climate system to external forcing. We also explain why (as noted above) this standard notion of climate sensitivity is insufficiently general -the fact that it is focused on equilibrium conditions is only part of the problem -and consider the challenges that remain for some alternative, more general notions that have been developed.
Section 5 is concerned with internal variability and radiative forcing. We note that internal variability is sometimes assumed to be a separable, independent component of total climate variability; this, we argue, does not seem to take into account the very plausible situation in which external forcing is changing the magnitude and frequency of climate system phenomena that are commonly taken to be expressions of internal variability, such as El Nino. With regard to radiative forcing, we explain why a more general notion of forcing seems to be required, highlighting connections with issues raised for the notions of climate system and climate sensitivity. Indeed, throughout the paper, we call attention to interconnections among the issues discussed.
Finally, in Section 6, we offer a concluding discussion. We review the issues that we have identified along the way, note some of the progress that has been made in addressing them, and suggest, partly on the basis of the work done here, that there is room for philosophers of science to contribute to addressing issues in the theoretical foundations of climate science. We close with some remarks on the importance of doing so.
Climate system
All of the issues we will examine concern climate systems or their features -their states, components, evolution and responses to external influences. A natural place to start our investigation is thus with the standard notion of Earth's climate system. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change provides what is, minor variations aside, the standard notion of Earth's climate system: Climate system. The climate system is the highly complex system consisting of five major components: the atmosphere, the hydrosphere, the cryosphere, the lithosphere and the biosphere and the interactions between them. The climate system evolves in time under the influence of its own internal dynamics and because of external forcings such as volcanic eruptions, solar variations and anthropogenic forcings such as the changing composition of the atmosphere and land-use change [IPCC 2014, p. 121] .
Here, the climate system is characterized in terms of its material components, especially a set of subsystems, and their causal interactions. Two issues that arise in connection with the standard notion are where to draw the boundary of our climate system and whether the system should be characterized in a wholly reductive way. We look at each of these issues in turn.
The standard notion specifies the boundary of the climate system in terms of the spatial boundaries of the system's components and, in doing so, makes clear that some factors, e.g., changes in solar irradiance, are external to our climate system. Yet, as climate scientists are well aware, it is not obvious that changes in volcanic aerosol concentrations, anthropogenic land-use changes or anthropogenic increases in CO2 concentrations should be considered external. After all, these are changes in the biosphere or the atmosphere and thus seem to be, according to the standard notion, within our climate system. An alternative suggestion that climate scientists sometimes make is that something counts as external to Earth's climate system on a given timescale if it is causally independent of changes in the system on that timescale (USNRC 2005, p. 14) . This would imply that volcanic aerosol concentration changes are external to the climate system on century timescales, because changes in the Earth's climate system do not impact volcanic activity except on much longer timescales. Some non-reductive characterisations of the climate system have been offered, however, with corresponding non-standard approaches to modelling it. For instance, Hasselmann (1976) proposes that we think of the climate system as comprising two types of processes, namely, fast weather processes and slow climate processes. This allows modelling the climate system using an equation that explicitly represents only slow climate processes; the effects of the fast weather Another proposal is that the climate system can be thought of as a type of system that operates out of thermodynamic equilibrium and is subject to a thermodynamic extremum principle that constrains how its entropy evolves. Specifically, it has been proposed that (MEP) our climate system is a system that evolves so as to maximize entropy production (Paltridge 1978 , Ozawa et al. 2003 , Dewar et al. 2014 ). In the original application of this idea, heat transport in the atmosphere was modelled so that it adjusts so as to maximize the production of the atmosphere's entropy (Paltridge 1978 (Ozawa et al. 2003 and Dewar et al. 2014 ).
As the examples cited above suggest, incorporating non-reductive elements in a characterization of Earth's climate system could matter in practice, because doing so might affect how climate is modelled. Indeed, it is plausible that further developing and evaluating nonreductive characterizations in order to guide modelling practice would be of value (cf. Harrison and Stainforth 2009). It may be useful to consider, for instance, the extent to which it is accurate and helpful to think of the climate system as a kind of heat engine, as the framework underlying MEP supposes. Models which implement non-reductive, global constraints on climate evolution, such as MEP, could complement the increasingly complex causal modelling that is the current focus of climate modelling. Increased computational efficiency aside, an advantage of such topdown modelling approaches is that they can guarantee that emergent properties of the climate system, to the extent that these are known, are captured by available models. 2 Even when the evidence for an emergent property is only suggestive, it would seem desirable to develop some climate models that reflect that property. This will help to ensure that the discipline is working with a set of models that reflects actual uncertainty about the nature of the climate system.
Developing non-reductive climate models, as well as the frameworks that guide the development of such models, may also contribute to a better understanding of climate phenomena; as Katzav and Parker (2015) note, just as global conservation principles can provide an understanding of some climatic phenomena, so too might principles that reference emergent properties and relationships.
Finally, one might think that a characterization of Earth's climate system could be guided by a more general notion of a climate system that applies to other planets as well. Such a notion, however, does not seem to have been developed, either in climate science (which tends to focus on Earth in particular) or in fields like planetary science, despite discussion of general features of planetary climate systems (e.g. Ozawa et al. 2003; Schubert and Mitchell 2013) . Moreover, on reflection, it seems likely that formulating a general notion of a climate system will involve the same two issues identified above -whether to be reductive and how to characterize boundaries.
Indeed, giving a characterization of climate system boundaries in general may be more challenging than specifying the boundaries of Earth's climate system since, in the general case, we cannot assume a fixed list of 'component' systems.
Climate states
The IPCC distinguishes between a narrow notion of climate and a broad one (IPCC 2014, pp. 119-120) . According to the narrow notion, climate is the statistical distribution of weather for a region over a period of time ranging from months to millions of years; the standard period of time is 30 years. The broader notion of climate considers not just weather conditions but conditions throughout the climate system (i.e., its full state, including conditions in the ocean, cryosphere, etc.). In some contexts, a dynamical systems perspective on climate is adopted, and climate is then identified with an attractor of a climate system (see, e.g., Palmer 1999 , Werndl 2016 (Daron and Stainforth 2013 , Hawkins et al. 2016 , and Sévellec et al. 2017 .
A second issue, also raised by Lovejoy and Schertzer, concerns whether the notion of climate should be reductive. They argue that the standard notion, along with the standard development of state-of-the-art climate models, assumes that the dynamics of climate is reducible to that of weather, that is, that it is just the dynamics of weather on relatively long timescales. This, they write, "seems naïve, since we know from numerous examples in physics that when processes repeat over wide enough ranges of space or time scale they typically display qualitatively new features" (Lovejoy and Schertzer 2013, p. 338 ). An alternative, they propose, is that the behaviour of climate is appropriately described by emergent laws that differ qualitatively from the laws of weather. Indeed, they, and others, provide a range of empirical evidence that suggests that climate does exhibit emergent regularities. (See, for example, Huybers and Curry 2006 , Lovejoy and Schertzer 2013 , Lovejoy 2015 , Rypdal and Rypdal 2016 There is much to consider here. Is thinking of climate states in terms of distributions of weather conditions indeed so intimately tied to a view about the dynamics of climate? Perhaps one can accept the standard way of thinking but still allow for an emergent climate dynamics.
There is also the question whether processes that are 'regular enough' should be expected to give rise to qualitatively new emergent features and, if they do, whether these will involve corresponding emergent laws or other emergent, but more local, relationships. In addition, note the parallel between this non-reductive approach to characterizing climate states and the suggestion, in the previous section, of the potential benefits of taking account of emergent laws and properties of the climate system when constructing climate models. In the case of climate states, it has been argued that taking account of emergent regularities may facilitate climate prediction (see, e.g., Lovejoy 2014). Thus, just as taking account of emergent laws and properties of the climate system might aid in learning about climate phenomena, so too might taking account of emergent properties of climate states.
Werndl (2016) suggests that whether the characterization of climate states should be done using finite or infinite distributions is also an issue that needs to be addressed. She notes that, since the external conditions affecting climate are time-dependent, there is no guarantee that a given climatic quantity will have a well-defined distribution at any sufficiently distant, future time. Climate scientists working in dynamical systems theory are aware that no such guarantee exists and have proposed that the climate of a system that does not have a well-defined distribution at a sufficiently distant, future time should be identified with the system's pullback attractor (Chekroun et al. 2011 , Ghil 2015 or with its so-called snapshot attractor (Drόtos et al. 2015) . In any case, when climate scientists do find it useful, e.g., for reasons of mathematical tractability, to use an infinite distribution to characterize a climate state, they are often careful to justify the appropriateness of this characterisation in empirical and theoretical terms (see, e.g., Pielke (2003; 2008) , however, proposes that changes in ocean heat content are a better indication of the actual heat accumulating in the climate system in response to radiative forcing as well as a better indication of future warming of the system. 3 He, accordingly, proposes that accumulated ocean heat content rather than changes in global mean surface temperature should be the primary measure of the specific aspect of climate change that is global warming (see also Victor and Kennel 2014) . One drawback of focusing on ocean heat content as a measure of global warming, however, is that this quantity -because it concerns conditions throughout the ocean -is even further removed than global mean surface temperature from the sorts of local changes in ocean and atmospheric conditions that matter to people and that thereby motivate policy action (Rahmstorf 2014) ; how, if at all, a given increase in ocean heat content affects us at a given time depends on how the increased heat is distributed in the ocean and, in particular, on the extent to which it affects ocean surface temperatures. Another significant drawback is that ocean heat content is quite difficult to measure (ibid.). The issue here seems to reflect a tension between the normative (which way of characterizing climate change best reflects our concerns) and the empirical (changes in global mean surface air temperature are not an accurate reflection of changes in the climate system's total heat storage).
Closely related to the notion of climate change are notions of climate sensitivity, which provide standardized ways of quantifying the response of the climate system to a change in forcing. The most widely used notion of climate sensitivity is that of equilibrium climate sensitivity. This notion is informally defined as the global mean surface temperature change that results from a doubling of atmospheric CO2 after the fast-acting feedback processes within the ocean-atmosphere system, e.g., the water-vapour feedback and cloud feedback, have reached equilibrium (Charney 1979 , IPCC 2014 , p. 1761 . 4 More formally, the notion of equilibrium climate sensitivity can be defined using what is called the climate sensitivity parameter, here represented by 'S'. S is given by ∆ /∆ , where ∆ is the difference in global mean surface temperature between two statistical steady states, i.e., two states that have unchanging mean surface temperature distributions, and ∆ is the radiative forcing associated with the cause of the transition between the states, e.g., with certain changes in atmospheric CO2 or CH4. Equilibrium climate sensitivity is then defined as the temperature change × ∆ 2× 2 , where ∆ 2× 2 is the change in forcing due to a doubling in CO2 levels . The more formal notion of equilibrium climate sensitivity is thus defined with respect to statistical steady states 4 A climate feedback is a process internal to the climate system that either amplifies or dampens the initial effect of external forcings or internal variability (USNRC 2005, p. 13).
rather than equilibrium. Moreover, the formal definition assumes that S does not depend on the type of forcing, something that facilitates estimating the joint effects of different kinds of forcings. Both assumptions are made in order to make equilibrium climate sensitivity something that is quantifiable and useful in practice (Sherwood et al. 2015) .
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Even so, the notion of equilibrium climate sensitivity remains insufficiently general in ways that make it ill-suited to some of the central inferential tasks that motivate thinking about the sensitivity of the climate system in the first place. First, the notion is applicable when Earth's mean surface temperature is in a statistical steady state; yet this condition is not generally met in reality. This complicates both estimating equilibrium climate sensitivity from data and using such estimates to make inferences about future changes that might occur in the actual climate system. For example, to try to infer climate sensitivity from palaeo-data, we might assume that data are being gathered from a time when the effects of fast feedback processes are no longer giving rise to a net top-of-the-atmosphere radiative imbalance, and thus are not affecting the global mean surface temperature distribution. But we still must try to correct for the effects of any slow feedbacks, e.g., of ocean heat uptake, which may not yet have equilibrated . While this issue is partly a matter of limited knowledge of what the slow feedbacks are, it is also partly that the notion of equilibrium climate sensitivity, by its very nature, provides no guidance as to how to take non-equilibrated feedbacks into account.
A second way in which the standard notion is insufficiently general is that it does not recognize that global temperature change, including the equilibrium response, can depend on the nature and spatial distribution of external forcings as well as on the state of Earth's climate system ). This kind of dependence might become important when, for example, trying to learn from palaeoclimate data, which often come from periods in which the climate system is thought to have been in a substantially different state from its current one (Skinner 2012 ).
This same lack of generality also complicates learning about the 'climates' of complex climate models (CCMs), that is, of atmosphere-ocean general circulation models and Earth system models. Energy balance climate models, as well as other simple climate models, can be designed -partly by tuning their parameters -to emulate the simulation output of CCMs. As a result, simple models can be used to try to predict the output of CCMs under forcing settings to which the CCMs have, due to computational cost or structural inflexibility, never been subject.
The equilibrium climate sensitivity parameter is an important tuned parameter in many simple models used to emulate CCMs. But it fails to account for the fact that climate sensitivity in CCMs is time-dependent and, indeed, is so partly because, as in the real climate system, it depends on the spatial distribution of external forcing (Senior and Mitchell 2000 , Meinshausen et al. 2011 , Knutti and Rugenstein 2017 .
The limited usefulness of the equilibrium climate sensitivity parameter in emulation is being addressed in a number of ways. Most directly, simple model emulation of CCMs has been improved by observing the time-dependence of the climate response to forcing in CCM simulations and, on this basis, introducing time-dependence into the climate sensitivity parameters of simple models (Meinshausen et al. 2011 ). In addition, the structure of emulators has been modified in order to try to accommodate the time-dependence of the climate response in CCM simulations (ibid.). Knutti and Rugenstein (2017) , however, note that studies grounded in CCMs have not managed to narrow the uncertainty about the current equilibrium climate sensitivity of the Earth system; the IPCC (Collins et al. 2013 ) assesses the likely range to be 1.5 °C -4.5 °C, which is the same range as the one provided by the Charney Report in 1979 (Charney, 1979) . In addition, CCMs are known to be subject to shared biases in their representation of feedbacks and thus in their estimates of equilibrium climate sensitivity (Knutti and Rugenstein 2017) . Consequently, it is worthwhile to consider other approaches to addressing problems with the notion of equilibrium climate sensitivity as well (von der Heydt et al. 2016, Knutti and Rugenstein 2017) .
Notably, there have been efforts in the paleoclimate context to generalize the notion of equilibrium climate sensitivity, motivated in part by the goal of improving palaeo-data based estimates of current climate sensitivity (von der Heydt et al. 2016). These generalized notions are often informed by considerations from dynamical systems theory. Dijkstra and Viebahn (2015) , for example, define the conditional climate sensitivity parameter ( , ) of a background or base climate state, ̅ , as follows:
Here, ∆ ( , ) = | ( ) − | is the maximum temperature difference that can occur during the period , given the constraint | (0) − | < , that is, the constraint that the initial temperature perturbation is sufficiently small. ∆ ( , ) is the change in radiative forcing over . Ghil (2015) provides a notion of climate sensitivity that extends to the non-equilibrium case and captures ways in which climate might respond to forcing that cannot be represented by a single scalar quantity.
These efforts focus on providing a sufficiently general mathematical characterization of climate sensitivity; they allow for additional ways in which the climate's response to radiative forcing might depend on the state of the climate system. They do not tell us, however, how to characterize this state. Yet, further developing the notion of a climate state by incorporating information about the drivers of climate variability (as discussed in Section 3) may facilitate the application of the more general ways of thinking about climate sensitivity. Incorporating such information might be helpful, for example, when attempting to draw conclusions about current climate sensitivity from palaeo-data based estimates of the (non-equilibrium) climate sensitivity of past climate states. In addition, such information might inform the use and development of simple dynamical models -i.e., simple models that represent the causal dependencies of key factors in the climate system -in order to learn about climate sensitivity. These simple models become particularly important in a context in which we aim, or need, to supplement studies that employ CCMs. 6 Information about drivers of variability might aid not only the selection of variables and processes to represent in the simple models but also, relatedly, judgments about when such models are sufficiently realistic to be of use in learning about climate sensitivity.
Ideally, then, drivers of variability (and other physical information used to characterize climate states) will be described in terms of physical quantities and structures that are not too difficult to represent in dynamical climate models, including simple models. Both the potential usefulness of developing notions of climate states that facilitate learning about climate sensitivity from palaeo-data and the potential usefulness of developing such notions in a way that facilitates the use of simple dynamical models in learning about climate sensitivity suggest that there may be some benefit to developing notions of climate states and climate sensitivity in tandem.
Finally, the focus on equilibrium climate sensitivity, and thus on global mean surface temperature, as a proxy for climate change itself deserves some consideration. Equilibrium climate sensitivity is a relatively easy to calculate and grasp proxy quantity for climate change in all its complexity. Whether it is the best proxy for these purposes is far from clear, in part for the reasons discussed above. Further questions about its suitability arise in light of the fact that climate change can arise independently of any global radiative imbalance at the tropopause and thus independently of radiative forcing as it is standardly understood. Anthropogenic climate change that can occur partly independently of a tropopause radiative imbalance, and thus that cannot be captured by the standard notion of forcing, includes climate change due to the radiative effects of absorbing aerosols, climate change due to perturbations of ozone in the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere, and climate change due to the radiative and non-radiative effects of changes in land-use, e.g. deforestation and urbanization (USNRC 2005 , p. 86, Sherwood et al. 2015 . We return to this issue in the final part of the next section.
Internal variability and radiative forcing
According to the IPCC, climate variability refers to variations in the mean state and/or other statistics of climate system conditions on all spatial and temporal scales beyond that of individual weather events (IPCC 2014, p.121) . Internal variability is understood to be a species of climate variability: it is variability in climate system conditions due to natural processes within the system. Alternatively, climate variability may be due to natural or anthropogenic external forcing, in which case it is "external variability" (ibid.). Some core methodologies of climate science assume that internal and external variability are distinct, additive components of total climate variability (Bindoff et al. 2013 , p.874, Knutti and Rugenstein 2017 , p.4, Parker 2010a ). 7 For example, standard 'fingerprint' methodologies for attributing recent climate change to particular causes ask whether observed variability is consistent with the sum of estimated contributions from different external forcings (including rising greenhouse gas concentrations) and internal variability; estimates of the latter are often obtained by running long simulations in which external conditions are held constant (e.g. at pre-industrial levels) (Bindoff et al. 2013 ). In the context of these methods, internal variability is variability that would occur in the absence of external forcings.
At least two issues arise in connection with this way of thinking about internal variability.
First, what counts as 'internal' versus 'external' obviously depends on how the boundaries of Earth's climate system are defined; as noted in Section 2, this is not a straightforward matter.
Second, it is quite plausible that, even on relatively short time scales, external forcing sometimes changes the operation of natural internal processes -changing, for instance, the magnitude and/or frequency of internal oscillations like the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (e.g. Knudsen et al. 2014 ). In such situations, are the changes in climate system conditions stemming from the changes in natural internal processes -such as more extreme droughts in some regions -part of a new pattern of internal variability, one associated with the post-forcing external conditions? Or are they part of external (i.e., forced) variability?
A problem with the first option is that it seems to render invisible the fact that the changes in natural internal processes -which in turn might be responsible for changes in extreme weather with harmful consequences -were caused by changes in external forcing. Indeed, it seems to leave us unable to attribute those additional harmful consequences to the relevant external forcing, such as rising greenhouse gas concentrations; they are part of (unforced) internal variability instead. In part for this reason, the second option seems more attractive.
Moreover, some standard attribution methodologies, as outlined above, also would characterize such changes in extreme weather as external variability, in accordance with the second option.
However, the second option raises challenges of its own. Taken at face value, it seems to lead to the conclusion that all climate variability is external variability, insofar as the operation of natural internal processes at any given time has been shaped in a host of ways by external forcing that occurred earlier in Earth's history. One way to avoid this conclusion is to understand internal variability in the way implied by current model-based methods for estimating it: the internal variability associated with time period T is the variability that would be expected to occur in that period if external conditions during T remained as they were at the start of T (i.e., at some fixed level Sherwood et al. 2015) . One approach would be to consider the total radiative forcing due to radiative tropopause imbalances and surface radiative forcing; the regional structure of radiative forcing, however, also needs to be taken into account, since this can affect which changes in climate are predicted to occur, and how to do this is largely unsettled.
Concluding remarks
We have identified a number of outstanding issues in the theoretical foundations of climate science. These include: how to draw the boundaries of the climate system; whether to pursue fully reductive notions of Earth's climate system and its states; whether climate states should be characterized statistically or in a combined physical-statistical way; which quantities (e.g. changes in global mean surface air temperature or ocean heat content) should be used in characterizing climate change; how to broaden notions of climate sensitivity in order to account for state-dependence and for spatial patterns of forcings; whether current ways of thinking about internal variability can accommodate situations in which external forcing substantially changes the operation of natural internal processes; and how to broaden the notion of forcing to accommodate processes that cause climate change but do not involve an energy imbalance at the tropopause. Along the way, we noted a number of connections among these issues. In particular, the issue of how to draw the boundaries of the climate system (and thus how to determine what is internal/external to the system) resurfaced a number of times, as did the question of how to characterize climate states.
Climate science has already begun to respond to some of these issues. For example, as we noted, more flexible notions of climate sensitivity have been developed in light of the limitations of the notion of equilibrium climate sensitivity. However, the use of these more flexible notions can bring its own challenges. For instance, in order to actually apply notions of climate sensitivity that account for state-dependence, one must come to some conclusion about what constitutes a climate state. In discussing the latter, we called attention to some advantages of a recent proposal to incorporate into the characterization of climate states information about physical drivers of conditions, rather than just statistical descriptions of those conditions. At the same time, we noted that, if such physical-statistical notions are to facilitate the application of generalized notions of climate sensitivity, it will be useful for information about physical drivers to be expressed in terms that can be represented by the variables and structures of dynamical climate models (which are used as aids in learning about climate sensitivity). These examples illustrate not only that it may be beneficial to address some issues in tandem, rather than individually, but also that progress in addressing issues in the theoretical foundations of climate science might often be made without abandoning existing notions entirely, but rather by supplementing or generalizing them.
We think that philosophers of science also could contribute when it comes to issues in the theoretical foundations of climate science. Most obviously, they might contribute by helping to articulate, in a clear and careful way, what the issues are. We have tried to do this in a preliminary way for the issues outline above, but for each there is room for significantly more work to be done. Philosophers might also propose ways forward in addressing some of these issues, as we have begun to, and even contribute to realizing these proposals, perhaps in collaboration with climate scientists. We think that it would be worthwhile to do so. Addressing issues like those that we have discussed can facilitate the development of clearer and more coherent ways of thinking about climate phenomena. Moreover, it can help climate science to become better equipped to tackle important explanatory and predictive tasks, including those related to global and regional climate change.
